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Comments and Casenotes
Admissibility Of Extrajudicial Identification As
Substantive Evidence
By MARTN A. DYE
In its efforts to identify a suspected criminal, it is common for the police department to line up a number of persons and to have a witness to the crime pick from the lot
the one whom he alleges committed the act. Occasionally,
photograph files are employed for this same purpose. Whatever the means used, the object is to obtain an indentification of the suspect as the one who committed the crime.
Although the effectiveness and validity of the various
methods of identification which are employed may vary
significantly, these identifications are of at least some value
if not conducted under manifestly unfair conditions. Even
assuming the efficacy and value of such identifications, however, controversy has long existed as to whether or not a
witness in a criminal case should be permitted to testify
as to his extrajudicial identification of the defendant. Often,
courts have rejected such evidence as hearsay.' Occasionally, however, the hearsay objections seem not to have
prevented the use of such testimony. Many courts have
admitted the evidence, either not having been apprised by
counsel of the problems which might be incident to its
admission or having resolved those difficulties to their
satisfaction, but without discussing the problem in their
opinions.2 Where the courts have clearly considered the
problems of admissibility of extrajudicial identification and
held such evidence to be admissible, they have generally
limited the use of such evidence to "corroboration" of the
witness's testimony on the stand.' Rarely, has the extra' See cases cited in 70 A.L.R. 910, 915; of. infra n. 24.
2See, e.g., following cases in which courts failed to Indicate the reason
for which evidence of an extrajudicial identification was admitted:
People v. Hood, 140 Cal. App. 2d 585, 295 P. 2d 525 (1956); State v.
Myer, 204 Iowa 118, 214 N.W. 710 (1927); State v. Jeffreys, 192 N.C.
318, 135 S.E. 32 (1926); People v. Hale, 64 Cal. App. 523, 222 P. 148
(1923) ; Smiley v. State, 156 Ga. 60, 118 S.E. 713 (1923) ; State v. Butler,
114 S.C. 433, 103 S.E. 762 (1920).
"Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 138 N.E. 2d 359 (1956)
People v. Bennett, 119 Cal. App. 2d 224, 259 P. 2d 476 (1953) ; State v.
McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P. 2d 663 (1953) ; People v. Slobodion, 31
Cal. 2d 555, 191 P. 2d 1 (1948) ; People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. 2d
528, 169 P. 2d 44 (1946); State v. Rhodes, 181 N.C. 481, 106 S.E. 456
(1921).
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judicial identification been admitted as substantive evidence.'
Several times the Maryland Court of Appeals has considered the problem of admissibility of extrajudicial identifications. Apparently, the first case in which this issue
was specifically presented to the Maryland Court was
Blake v. State.' Against a strong dissent, the majority of
the court adhered to the view then prevalent in most jurisdictions that such testimony is hearsay and inadmissible.'
It was not until twenty-seven years later, when the Court
decided Basoff v. State,' that it indicated a retreat from its
former position in the Blake case and said that an extrajudicial identification of the accused, made under proper
circumstances, may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule and, if admitted, would constitute
"corroborative" evidence.' In that decision, the Court went
'70 A.L.R. 910, 911 comments:
"In recent years, . . . the tendency has been towards the admission
of such testimony both as substantive and corroborative evidence,
so that now there exists a fairly balanced weight of authority on
the question, with a slight preponderance of Jurisdictions favoring
admission."
Upon inspection of the cases cited therein, this writer was not able to
find any in which evidence of an extrajudicial identification was admitted
as substantive evidence. But see infra, n. 24.
5157 Md. 75, 145 A. 185 (1929).
6Ibid., 80-82.
'208 Md. 643, 119 A. 2d 917 (1956).
8 Although it is clearly intimated in the Basoff case, supra, n. 7, at no
point in that case does the Court expressly state that testimony as to
an extrajudicial identification is admissible for corroborative purposes
only. This interpretation of the Basoff case has been made by the Court
in Judy v. State, infra, n. 9.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of
the verb "to corroborate". The word is derived from the Latin, "corroborate", which means simply "to strengthen". OxFORD UNIVERSAL DIc'rIONARY OF HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (3rd ed. 1955) 399. When used in the Law
of Evidence either alone or in the phrase "corroborative evidence", this
fundamental meaning is retained, but overtones peculiar to problems of
evidence are acquired which give the word a certain ambiguity. A statement in dispute can be corroborated merely by the accumulation of other
statements, none of which are necessarily true, but all of which, because
of their consistency with the statement in question, point to the conclusion that the statement sought to be proved is true. As applied to the
particular problem of this comment, extrajudicial identifications are
corroborative in this sense when they are used to support the testimony
of the identifying witness by suggesting that the testimony is more probably true because the witness has said the same thing on other occasions.
By such a method of corroboration, one reasons that because statements
B, C, D and E all agree with what is asserted in statement A, statement
A is, therefore, probably true. One does not endeavor to prove that each
of the statements B, C, D and E is, in fact, true, but rather relies on
the sheer accumulation of statements to be persuasive. Indeed, whether
those statements are true in fact is not the question. This type of corroboration, for reasons explained hereinafter, shall be referred to as
"crediting evidence". As used in this sense, crediting evidence is intended
to be the direct opposite in meaning of substantive evidence. It is like
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as far as any court in the country seems to have gone in
admitting such evidence, in the absence of statutory mandate.
The culmination of this series of cases was reached in
1958 when the Court decided Judy v. State.9 The defendant had been indicted and tried in the Criminal Court of
Baltimore on a charge of attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon. During the trial, an already con"impeaching evidence", except that it supports, instead of attacks, the
witness.
The term, "corroborative evidence" can be used in still another sense
in which it is hardly distinguishable from "substantive evidence". In
this sense, corroborative evidence is evidence which, because of its assumed
or proved truth, is taken to establish the truth of a proposition in question. The jury is asked to believe that because statements B, C, D and E
are true, statement A is also true. In the jargon of the law of Evidence,
statements B, C, D and E are given substantive value, and their effect
is to corroborate statement A, which is the proposition sought to be
proved. In our case the extrajudicial identification is corroborative in
this sense when it is taken directly for its truth to prove the identity
of the defendant along with the testimony of the identifier, which it
reiterates and reinforces.
A striking example of this usage of corroborating evidence is found in
the requirement that the evidence of an accomplice be corroborated. 7
WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940 § 2056-2060. It is probably in this sense
that the Maryland Court of Appeals was using the expression "corroborative evidence" in Judy v. State, intra, n. 9. There, the Court stated that
its earlier opinion in the Basoff case, 8upra, n. 7, held that an extrajudicial
identification of the accused may be admitted in evidence "as an exception
to the hearsay rule, and, if admitted, would constitute corroborative evidence". Manifestly, only if the corroborative evidence were given some
substantive value would there be any hearsay problem which would necessitate admission of this evidence as an ewception to the hearsay rule. See
also Wright v. State .... Md.
, 150 A. 2d 733, 737 (1959), where the
Court of Appeals, holding that there was sufficient corroboration of the
testimony of two accomplices that the defendant had participated in the

offense charged, quotes this statement from 1
DENcE (5th ed. 1956) § 185:

UNDE&HiLL, CRImINAL

EvI-

" . . it seems that the corroboration which with some degree of
cogency tend8 to e8tabUi8h facts material and relevant which would
authorize the jury to credit accomplice's testimony should be
sufficient.'"
Implicit in the requirement that corroborative evidence tend "to establish
facts" seems to be the attributing of substantive value to such evidence.
Only substantive evidence "tends to establish facts."
Hereinafter, therefore, we shall distinguish these two different usages
of the term "corroborative evidence" in the following manner. Evidence
which is offered only to strengthen the testimony of a witness and which
is not offered as an assertion of its truth, i.e. as substantive evidence, but
merely to show that on a prior occasion the witness made another statement which is the same as, or consistent with, his present testimony shall
be referred to as "crediting evidence". On the other hand, evidence offered
to support the testimony of the witness, but which must be given some
substantive value by the trier of fact in order that it accomplish that
purpose, shall be referred to as "corroborative evidence". That the distinction between this type of evidence and "substantive evidence" is difficult, if not impossible to make, seems quite apparent. The distinction is
made primarily because the courts have persisted in making it.
'218 Md. 168, 146 A. 2d 29 (1958).
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victed accomplice in the crime was permitted to testify, over
objection, that three days after his arrest, he had identified
a photograph of the defendant for the police from among
other photographs. At the trial, both the victim and the
accomplice identified the defendant as the person who was
the other participant in the attempted robbery. Appealing from his conviction and sentence, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in admitting testimony
by the witness as to his extrajudicial identification of the
defendant. Judge Homey, speaking for the unanimous
Court of Appeals, affirmed the judgment, holding that
where the identity of the accused is an issue, it is proper
to permit a witness, even though he may have been an
accomplice, to testify as to a previous identification of a
photograph of the defendant. In regard to such testimony
as to an extrajudicial identification, the Court stated:
a... should be admitted for the purpose of corroborating the witness and bolstering his credibility, if for
no other purpose. Indeed, we are of the opinion that
the mere relation by a witness of a previous act of
identifying a photograph of a person he knew or recognized is not hearsay, that it is admissible as substantive evidence, and that it is not subject to the preliminary inquiry as to unreliability or unfairness."'"
With its decision in the Judy case, the Court of Appeals
sets itself clearly among those states, such as New York,
where testimony as to an extrajudicial identification of a
defendant is admissible not only for crediting purposes,
but also as substantive evidence. What distinguishes this
holding from similar ones in New York, however, is that
the Maryland Court of Appeals was acting without the
sanction of statute." Inspection of the decided cases and
the legal principles involved will readily attest to the wisdom of the court's decision. As if the decision in the Judy
case were not in itself remarkable enough, the Court fol-oIbid., 174.

nExamples of statutory provisions which either provide expressly that
testimony as to an extrajudicial identification shall be admitted as substantive evidence, or which have been so construed, are: N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PROC. (1953), § 393-b; and 29 PAGE'S OHIO REV. CODE (1954) § 2945.55
(G.C. 13444-16). In New York, prior to passage of this statute, the Court
of Appeals had followed strictly People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 106
N.E. 105 (1914), which had held that evidence of an extrajudicial identification was not admissible unless the witness had been impeached, and then,
it would be admitted only to corroborate him. The leading case construing the New York statute is People v. Spinello, 277 App. Div. 712, 102
N.Y.S. 2d 803, aff'd. 303 N.Y. 193, 101 N.E. 2d 457 (1951), noted 27 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 367 (1952) and 36 Minn. L. Rev. 530 (1952).
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lowed it, early this year, with an equally extraordinary
decision in Bulluck v. State,12 holding "clearly admissible"
the testimony of a detective that he saw and heard the
victim identify the accused in a police line-up, citing the
Judy case as authority.
In determining a proper result in this general area, four
distinct problems should be considered: (1) whether the
testimony of a witness as to his prior extrajudicial identification of a defendant, or other person, when offered as
substantive evidence, is hearsay; (2) whether, assuming
that such testimony is hearsay, it is, or should be admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule; (3) projecting the
problem onto a more general plane, whether the hearsay
rule should apply to the general case where the declarant
is the witness available for cross-examination; and (4)
whether the testimony of a third person as to the extrajudicial identification made by another should be admissible. Before considering specifically these problems, however, it is important to examine the broad area from which
they have evolved so that the isolated area of extrajudicial
identification can be seen in its proper perspective.
I.
NON-HEARSAY USES OF PRIOR CONSISTENT AND PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS GENERALLY

The rule excluding hearsay forbids the use of extrajudicial statements, i.e., those made by one who is not
subject to the sanction of oath and the testing of crossexamination, as proof of the truth of the assertions con13
tained in those statements, i.e., as substantive evidence.
The extrajudicial statements of a witness may, however,
in appropriate situations, be admitted in evidence for nonsubstantive purposes. For example, courts have generally
permitted the use of prior inconsistent statements of a
witness for the purpose of impeachment. 4 Use of the
-219 Md. 67, 148 A. 2d 433 (1959).
IsMcCormick, The Borderland of Hcarsay, 39 Yale L. J. 489, 490 (1930).
This rule is followed in at least 41 jurisdictions and the Federal courts.
See, State v. Balto. Contracting Co., 177 Md. 1, 15, 6 A. 2d 625 (1939);
Acker v. Acker, 172 Md. 477, 493-4, 192 A. 327 (1937) ; U. S. F. & a. Co. v.
Cont'l. Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, 190 A. 768 (1927) ; Clay v. State, 211 Md.
577, 583, 128 A. 2d 634 (1957). Cases from other jurisdictions collected:
133 A.L.R. 1454, 1455-1457.
11"It is clear that prior statements by a witness which contradict his
testimony are admissible for the purpose of impeaching or discrediting
him." 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1455. Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md.
354, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956) ; West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 100
A. 2d 17 (1953).
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extrajudicial statement for this limited purpose involves
no violation of the hearsay rule, since the statement is
not introduced as substantive evidence, but only to show
that at some prior time, the witness made a statement
which is inconsistent with what he now professes to be
the truth and, for that reason, the witness's credibility is
not free from question. 5
This distinction between the use of evidence for impeachment and for substantive purposes persists to this
day, despite the plausible arguments of scholars that the
legal distinction between the two is usually meaningless
to the jury, or, if not meaningless, is impossible to apply
in evaluating the huge mass of evidence which the jury
is called upon to assess in arriving at its verdict. 6 However valid the legal distinction between substantive and
impeaching evidence may be in theory, it is argued that
it must ultimately break down in practical application,
since a statement admitted only for impeachment purposes
is likely to be given substantive value by the7 jury in order
that the witness's credibility be impugned.'
Possibly by analogy to the reasoning which made possible the admission of prior inconsistent statements of a
witness for the purpose of impeachment, some courts have
admitted the prior consistent statements of a witness as
crediting testimony.8 These courts compose a distinct
minority, however, for most courts adhere staunchly to
the view that prior consistent statements of a witness are
inadmissible for this purpose.'" And, even in those states,
such as Maryland, which admit prior consistent statements
as crediting evidence, such statements have been admitted
20 Am. Jua. 405, Evidence, §458.
l "The distinction is not one that most jurors would understand. If they
could understand it, it seems doubtful that they would attempt to follow
it." MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1954) 77; 133 A.L.R.
1454, 1466; Medlin v. County Board of Education, 167 N.C. 239, 83 S.E.
483, 484 (1914). 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §1018(b).
17MCCORMICK, op. cit. ibid. 78.
18See, e.g., American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 171 A. 54 (1934)
Cross v. State, 118 Md. 660, 670, 86 A. 223 (1912) ; Piehler v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 360 Mo. 12, 226 S.W. 2d 681 (1950) ; State v. Bethea,
186 N.C. 22, 118 S.E. 800 (1923). See also, decisions collected in 140 A.L.R.
21, 49-77, 4 WioMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 16, §1126.
194 WIGMORE, op. cit. 8upra, n. 16, 194, makes this unqualified statement:
"When the witness has merely testified on direct examination, without any impeachment, proof of consistent statements is unnecessary
and valueless. * * * Such evidence would ordinarily be both irrelevant
and cumbersome to the trial; and is rejected in all Court." [Emphasis
supplied.]
See Goldberg v. United States, 213 F. 2d 734 (4th Cir. 1954) (obiter
dictum) ; Brown v. State, 309 S.W. 2d 452 (Tex., 1958) ; Mellon v. U. S.,
170 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 106 P. 2d
354 (1940) ; State v. Teitle, 117 Vt. 190, 90 A. 2d 562 (1952).
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only for the very limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness whose testimony has been impeached by prior inconsistent statements or by evidence showing that the witness
had fabricated his testimony to meet the exigencies of the
case.2" Although irrelevancy may well be a legitimate basis
for the fairly general exclusion of testimony of prior consistent statements offered as crediting evidence, it does
not seem that any hearsay objection can be sustained if
the rationale of the hearsay rule is strictly adhered to.
Evidence of an extrajudicial consistent statement not introduced to prove the assertion which that statement contains, but only to show that on a prior occasion, the witness
made the same statement that he is now making, is technically not hearsay.2 On the other hand, however, a valid
hearsay objection conceivably could be raised when a prior
consistent statement is to be given any substantive value.
II.

Is THE SUBSTANTIVE USE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL IDENTIFICATION
HEARSAY IN THEORY?

Inasmuch as testimony as to an extrajudicial identification is one type of evidence of a prior consistent statement,
it would not unreasonably be supposed that the evidentiary
problems are basically the same for both. And, by specific application of the rules which are usually applied to
evidence of prior consistent statements, the following
propositions would seem justified: (1) use of an extrajudicial identification for the purpose of giving credit to
identification made by the witness, in court, would involve
no violation of the hearsay rule, since the prior identification is being offered not to prove the assertion which it
contains, but only to show that on a prior occasion the witness made the same statement that he is now making; (2)
2 In addition to the cases already cited, spra, n. 18, see also: City Pass.
Ry. Co. v. Knee, 83 Md. 77, 34 A. 252 (1896); Mallonee v. Duff, 72 Md.
283, 19 A. 708 (1890) ; Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 12 N.E. 2d 194
(1937) ; Commonwealth v. Calderbank, 161 Pa. Super. 492, 55 A. 2d 422
(1947); State v. D'Ippolito, 22 N.J. 318, 126 A. 2d 1 (1956) ; People v.
Walsh, 47 Cal. 2d 36, 301 P. 2d 247 (1956); Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn.
107, 296 S.W. 2d 879 (1956). Only one case can be found in which corroborative (crediting) evidence was held to be admissible not only to support the testimony of a witness who has been impeached, but also to corroborate an unimpeached witness as to any fact in issue in the case:
Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 830 (Fla., 1954).
21 It
is interesting to note that at no point in his work does WimoRE,
state that use of prior consistent statements to support the credit of a
witness violates the hearsay rule. Rather, he indicates that the reason
for the general exclusion of such evidence is that it Is "irrelevant and
cumbersome to the trial". 4 WIGMORE, op. cit., 8upra, n. 16, circa §§1122
et seq.
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any attempted use of evidence of an extrajudicial identification for substantive purposes would violate the hearsay
rule. But, as we shall see, the latter proposition, at least,
is not necessarily true, either in the limited area of extrajudicial identification or in the general area of prior consistent statements.
Except in those states where statutes exist authorizing
the admission of extrajudicial identifications - and those
statutes have been construed to mean that such evidence,
when introduced, should be given substantive force - the
courts of this country with few exceptions, have rejected,
as hearsay, testimony as to an extrajudicial identification
offered as an assertion of its truth.22 Similarly, use of the
prior identification even for the limited purpose of corroborating (giving credit to) the witness has been condemned,
unless there had been an impeachment of the witness or
his testimony. 3 In recent years, however, there has been
a tendency toward the admission of such testimony, usually
as crediting, and occasionally as substantive, evidence.24
Infra, n. 24.
"The leading case for this proposition, followed by courts of many
jurisdictions, is People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 106 N.E. 105 (1914),
now changed by statute in New York, supra, n. 11. See also: Thompson v.
State, 223 Ind. 39, 58 N.E. 2d 112 (1944) ; Trimble v. State, 227 Ark. 867,
302 S.W. 2d 83 (1957).
" 70 A.L.R. 910, as of 1930, lists 22 jurisdictions and England as having
decided the question of whether such evidence Is admissible and of those,
13 admitted evidence of an extrajudicial identification; 8 excluded the
evidence. Note that Maryland was not included in this compilation. Of
the jurisdictions listed, all either admitted the evidence to "corroborate"
(this term being used in different senses in the various cases) the witness's
testimony or were unclear as to the purpose of the admission. As of this
date, at least 28 jurisdictions have considered the question of admissibility
of extrajudicial identifications; 25 have admitted the evidence for one
purpose or another; only 3 now exclude it (some having changed position).
With the exception of the Maryland Court of Appeals in the Judy case,
the 'Pennsylvania Court In Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125
A. 2d 442 (1956), possibly the California court in People v. Hood, 140
Cal. App. 2d 585, 295 P. 2d 525 (1956), and New York and Ohio, where
statutes, cited supra, n. 11, provide for the admission of evidence of an
extrajudicial Identification, no state which has considered the question
seems clearly to hold that such evidence is admissible as substantive
evidence.
Following is a list of states in which the question has been considered
and decision made as to its admissibility: EVIDENcc ADMIrm - State v.
Frost, 105 Conn. 326, 135 A. 446 (1926); People v. Filas, 369 Ill. 51, 15
N.E. 2d 496 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 138 N.E. 2d
359 (1956) ; Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A. 2d 442 (1956) ;
Casa v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. 607, 78 S.W. 2d 962 (1935) ; Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky., 1957), noted 36 Tex. L. Rev. 666 (1958) ;
State v. DePoortere, 303 S.W. 2d 920 (Mo., 1957) ; People v. Aguirre, 158
Cal. App. 2d 304, 322 P. 2d 478 (1958) ; People v. Hood, 140 Cal. App. 2d
585, 295 P. 2d 525 (1956) ; People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. App. 2d 555, 191
P. 2d 1 (1948) ; State v. Rafferty, 145 Kan. 795, 67 P. 2d 1111 (1937);
State v. Connelly, 5 N.J. Misc. 375, 136 A. 603 (1927) (New Jersey's position
is not very clear in this case, which seems to be the only one in which
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None of the cases in which this testimony has been admitted seem to have dealt adequately with the hearsay
objection which is said to arise when evidence of the extrajudicial identification is given substantive value.
Scholars in the law of Evidence, although generally
agreeing that such evidence should be admitted, seem to
have reached this conclusion by different means. Professor
McCormick seems to proceed on the basis that an extrajudicial identification, when offered as substantive evidence, is hearsay, and that it should be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule.2" Professor Morgan, on the
other hand, apparently believes that such testimony is
not hearsay. 26 The basis for these varying points of view
seems to lie in a substantial difference in the definitions

of hearsay which these authors adopt.
McCormick defines hearsay evidence as:
".... testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of the matters as-

serted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."'27
Morgan adopts the definition of Greenleaf that hearsay is:
"'... that kind of evidence which does not derive its
value solely from the credit to be given to the witness
the question has been considered) ; State v. Carlson, 50 Wash. 2d 220, 310
P. 2d 867 (1957) ; State v. Wilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P. 2d 288 (1951) ;
State v. Lanegan, 192 Or. 691, 236 P. 2d 438 (1951) ; Judy v. State, 218
Md. 168, 146 A. 2d 29 (1958); McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 429,
4 S.E. 2d 768 (1939) (Testimony by mother as to her daughter's extrajudicial identification of defendant admitted as part of the res gestae);
People v. Kiely, 230 Mich. 403, 203 N.W. 112 (1925) (admitted, but no
discussion as to problems of admissibility) ; State v. Klashtorni, 177 Minn.
363, 225 N.W. 278 (1929) ; State v. Ayles, 205 Ia. 1024, 219 N.W. 41 (1928);
Peterson v. State, 227 Ala. 361, 150 So. 156 (1933) ; Smiley v. State, 156
Ga. 60, 118 S.E. 713 (1923); State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P. 2d
663 (1953) ; Martin v. State, 100 Fla. 16, 129 So. 112 (1930); State v.
Jeffreys, 192 N.C. 318, 135 S.E. 32 (1926) ; State v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20,
133 S.E. 190 (1926) ; State v. Howie, 213 N.C. 782, 197 S.E. 611 (1938)
(testimony of a policeman as to extrajudicial identification made by
another, admitted) ; State v. Butler, 114 S.C. 433, 103 S.E. 762 (1920);
New York and Ohio both have statutes providing for admission of such
evidence, supra, n. 11.
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED Jacoby v. State, 203 Ind. 321, 180 N.E. 179 (1932);
Thompson v. State, 223 Ind. 39, 58 N.E. 2d 112 (1944) ; Trimble v. State,
227 Ark. 867, 302 S.W. 2d 83 (1957); McCandless v. State, 44 Oki. Cr.
113, 279 P. 933 (1929) ; Alberty v. State, 68 Oki. Cr. 246, 97 P. 2d 904 (1939).
Infra, n. 29.
Infra, n. 30.
McCoRMIcK, op. cit. 8upra, n. 16, 460.
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himself, but rests also, in part, on the veracity and
28
competency of some other person.'
The scope of McCormick's definition seems significantly
broader than that of Morgan. It does not appear to limit
hearsay to those statements of a declarant who is not a
witness, but includes also those out-of-court assertions
made by the witness himself, if they are offered in court as
assertions of their truth.29 The implication of the Morgan
definition would seem to be that where the evidence derives its value solely from the credit to be given to the
witness himself and does not rest upon the veracity or
competency of some other person, it is not hearsay. 30 The
determinative test under this definition would probably
be this: Is it only this witness whose statements we are
asked to believe, whether those statements were originally
made in court or out of court, or is it that we are asked
also to believe the statement of some person other than
this witness? If the former, the statement is not hearsay;
if the latter, it is hearsay and subject to exclusion. Under
this definition, it would seem that generally, where the
declarant and witness are identical, an extrajudicial assertion would not be hearsay and would be admissible, unless
there were some other basis for its exclusion.
It is apparently on the basis of the Morgan definition
that the Maryland Court of Appeals, in the Judy case, was
able to reach its decision that evidence of an extrajudicial
28 MORGAN,
SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF (1956) 131, and Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177 (1948).
1 That this is a correct interpretation of McCormick's definition is clearly
indicated by this statement from his text:
"The reason for the orthodox view that a previous statement of the
witness, though admissible to impeach, is not evidence of the facts
stated, is clear and obvious. When used for that purpose, the statement is hearsay. Its value rests on the credit of the declarant who
was not under oath nor subject to cross-examination, when the statement was made." [Emphasis supplied]. McCoRMIcK, Op. cit., supra,
n. 16, 74.
Although McCormick is here referring to the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, it is manifest that the same reasoning would be

applied also to prior consistent statements.
Essentially, the same definition of hearsay as that used by McCormick
was adopted by Professor Strahorn in Extra-Legal Materials and the Law
of Evidence, reprinted 15 Md. L. Rev. 330, 340, 343 (1955). For a judicial
argument that the fact that witness and declarant are one and the same
does not prevent the declaration from being hearsay, see State v. Saporen,
205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
'0MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF (1956) 133:
"The evidence derives its value solely from the credit to be given
to the witness or witnesses. Its value is not measured by the credit
to be given to any person not sworn as a witness and subject to crossexamination. It falls beyond the boundaries of hearsay as described
by Greenleaf and Underhill." [Emphasis supplied].
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identification, when used substantively, is not hearsay.
In fact, the Court almost quotes that definition in its
opinion. 1 Had the Court of Appeals followed the McCormick definition, as it seems to have done in the Basoff
case, 32 then the conclusion would have been inescapable
that testimony as to an extrajudicial identification offered
by a witness as evidence of the truth of the facts which it
asserts, whether that identification was made by the witness or by some third person, would be hearsay and subject to exclusion (unless treated as an exception).
A categorical statement as to whether or not evidence
of an extrajudicial identification, or of any other extrajudicial statement, is hearsay does not seem possible, for
how one labels a particular statement seems to depend
largely upon the definition of hearsay which he chooses
to adopt. In the final analysis, the question of which definition is more desirable probably turns primarily on
whether the subjection to cross-examination required to
make a declaration non-hearsay, should be subjection to
immediate cross-examination, as soon as the declarant has
spoken, or whether the right to cross-examination at some
future time should be sufficient protection. If one adopts
the argument of Morgan, the extrajudicial consistent statement of a witness-declarant could not be excluded as
hearsay as his presence in court and availability for crossexamination would be sufficient. Adhering to the McCormick test, however, the court would be obliged to exclude such statements of a declarant-witness, for the fact
that the declarant-witness is present in court and available
for cross-examination would not alter the original hearsay
character of his utterance. As persuasive as the Morgan
argument seems to be, there is only scant authority to
support it. The courts seem still to adhere to the view
that any extrajudicial statement offered as substantive
evidence, but not subjected to immediate cross-examination,
is hearsay. 3 Assuming, as we must, therefore, that substantive use of an extrajudicial identification is hearsay,
we proceed to consider the question whether such evidence
should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
8'Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-5, 146 A. 2d 29 (1958). The Court cites
20 Am. Jun., Evidence, §451, as authority for this definition. It will be
noted that this definition and that adopted by Professor Morgan are almost
identical.
12 Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A. 2d 917 (1956).
sAs to the inadmissibility of extrajudiclal statements In general, as
substantive evidence, see 2 JoNFs, EwDN CE (5th ed. 1958) §271. As to
the inadmissibility of extrajudicial Identifications as substantive evidence,
8upra, n. 24.
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III.
SHOULD THERE BE A HAsAY EXCEPTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE
USE OF ExTRAJuDIcIAL IDENTLF[CATION WHERE

WITNEss AND DECLARANT ARE IDENTICAL?

Generally, exceptions to the hearsay rule have been
established where otherwise hearsay evidence meets two
qualifications: (1) some characteristic of the hearsay assertion is present which makes it inherently trustworthy; and
(2) there is some necessity for the admission of the hearsay testimony,3 4 such as the unlikeliness or impossibility of
obtaining other evidence by alternative routes. 5 Every
characteristic of an extrajudicial identification seems to
justify its admission in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule where the witness is also the declarant.
The dangers usually incident to hearsay are almost nonexistent in the case of an extrajudicial identification."
Because such identification is always made closer in time
to the commission of the offense involved, when the recollection of the witness is fresher and less likely to have
been influenced by confusing external factors, McCormick
feels that the prior identification is not merely of equal
reliability with the witness's identification in court, but
is superior in trustworthiness." There is an abundance of
legal and psychological authority to support the proposition that a statement nearer to the event is usually more
" 2 JONES, ibid., §§269, 272 et seq. ; 5 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra, n. 16, 205,
where that author states that the existence of any one of the following
factors indicates the trustworthiness of an otherwise hearsay statement:
"a. Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate
statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be
formed;
"b. Where, even though a desire to falsify might present itself, other
considerations, such as the danger of easy detection or the fear of
punishment, would probably counteract its force;
"c. Where the statement was made under such conditions of publicity
that an error, if it had occurred, would probably have been detected
and corrected."
Wigmore implies that exception may be founded merely on one of these
considerations, but that more often, it rests on the operation, in different
degrees, of two of them. See also Morgan's statement of the factors on
which exceptions to the hearsay rule are based: 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE (1954) 222 et seq. And see Strahorn, Extra-Legal Materials
and the Law of Evidence, reprinted, 15 Md. L. Rev. 330, 343 (1955).
"In discussing the necessity principle, Wigmore states that necessity
may exist because the declarant is "otherwise unavailable", as In the case
of a dying declaration, or it may exist because the assertion is such "that
we cannot expect, again or at this time, to get evidence of the same value
from the same or other sources", as in the case of spontaneous declarations.
5 WIGMOR, op. cit. supra, n. 16, 204.
"Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 Harv. L. Ed. 177 (1948).
McCoRiicxI,
op. cit., supra, n. 16, 75.
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reliable than any subsequent statement. 8 Perhaps, however, the strongest and most persuasive language as to the
value and trustworthiness of an extrajudicial identification
is contained in the opinion
of the Missouri Court of Appeals
39
in State v. Buschmann:
"We know that impressions not firmly fixed in the
mind are more likely to fade with lapse of time than
those which have been more firmly and clearly impressed. Seeing a person repeatedly tends to fix in
the mind the impression of that person's form and
features, so that memory of his appearance will likely
be clearer and recognition of him more certain after
the lapse of a considerable time than if he had been
seen but once. If one sees another person but once,
perhaps fleetingly or under stress of excitement without opportunity for careful observance, it is easily conceivable that he may know that person again if seen
the next day, but not be able so confidently to identify
him if not seen again until six months or a year later."4"
Again, in State v. Frost,4 we find the highest court of Connecticut commenting on the relative values of a prior idenU

MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE LAWYER

(1929)

226; WHITMER,

PSY-

(2nd ed. 1951) 242; Gardner, The Perceptionand Memory
of Witnesses, 18 Corn. L.Q. 391, 392-394 (1933) ; Hutchins and Slesinger,
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Memory, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
860, 864, 867 (1928); Brown, An Experience in Identification Testimony,
25 Crim. L., C. & P. S. 621 (1934).
BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 88, contains these very pertinent
observations:
"Time is the essence of memory. * * * The greater the elapsed time
between the observing of an event and the reporting upon it in a court
of law the greater will be the unreliability of the testimony. The
memory of everyone is subject to deterioration. A person who today
was a witness to a railroad accident might remember the important
details for some time, especially if there were vivid and startling consequences . . . but time, the fortunate healer of memory wounds,
gradually smothers the details until finally all that would be remembered would be that an accident occurred in which some people were
injured."
Again at 90:
"Suggestion not only creates artificial memory out of nothing, but it
changes existing memories to suit its own ends. It is one of the
principal causes of inaccurate testimony. Newspapers are very suggestive. * * * Lawyers themselves may exert a suggestive influence on
prospective witnesses.
"Memory may be disturbed by constant talking about the facts which
are remembered."
See also comments in State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P. 2d 663, 667
(1953) ; People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 191 P. 2d 1, 4 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A. 2d 442, 445 (1956). For general discussion and further references, see 4 WIGMoRE, Op. cit., supra, n. 16
§1130.
"325 Mo. 553, 2D S.W. 2d 688 (1930).
Ibid., 692.
"105 Conn. 326, 135 A. 446 (1926).
CHOLOGY IN LAW,
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tification and an identification made for the first time in
the court room:
"The trustworthiness of the indentification is of
first importance. An identification of an accused, made
publicly for the first time by a witness in court, when
there presumably have been many opportunities for
the witness to have seen the accused and to have heard
him spoken of by a given name, may be open to question, but, if it be shown that the witness identified
the accused previously and the first time after his arrest
...under circumstances which removed the suspicion
of unfairness or unrealiability, the prior identification,... will be of utmost aid in determining the trustworthiness
of the identification made in the court
42
room."

Undoubtedly, the extrajudicial identification itself may
be unreliable. Far too often, people are mistaken about
the identity of others. Even when the contact with a person is made under the most favorable circumstances, one
is often unable to describe or accurately identify a stranger.
When the contact is made under strained circumstances in
which the identifier is emotionally overwrought and the
contact itself is only brief, as is the usual situation in the
relation of criminal to his victim, there is even greater
possibility for error in identification. Assuming, however,
the real possibility of inaccuracies in all identifications
and acknowledging the need for the existence of maximum
precautions to assure fairness and correctness in the identification process, one must agree that as between a prior
identification and that made in court for the first time, the
former is likely to be the more reliable of the two, if for
no reason other than its greater proximity to the event. Its
remoteness to the event robs an identification at the trial
of most of its value, and it is from the fact that an uncorroborated or unsubstantiated identification made in the
court room has little testimonial force that the necessity
for the admission of the extrajudicial identification arises.
This view has been expressed both by Wigmore and the
Maryland Court of Appeals.43
There is an additional factor which greatly enhances
the reliability and trustworthiness of an extrajudicial iden2 Ibid., 452.

424 WIGMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 16, §1130, Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643,
651, 119 A. 2d 917 (1956) ; Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174, 146 A. 2d 29
(1958).
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tification: the fact that the person who made the identification is usually a witness in the case and, as such, is available
for cross-examination. Any weakness which may have been
inherent in the extrajudicial statement can thereby be
subjected to as close scrutiny as any statement of the witness made on the stand for the first time. If, indeed, the
prior identification was incorrect, cross-examining counsel
has opportunity to show the inaccuracy; if it was made
under suspicious circumstances, this also can be shown
through cross-examination. If, however, the prior identification was an accurate one, its admission in evidence
would serve only to remove any weakness which may
otherwise have been inherent in the court room identification.
IV.
SHOULD THERE BE A GENERAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR
ALL CASES IN WHICH WITNESS AND DECLARANT
ARE IDENTICAL?

case,4 4

In the Judy
the Court of Appeals quotes Professor
Morgan for the proposition that "[w]hen the Declarant
is also a witness, it is difficult to justify classifying as hearsay evidence of his own prior statements. ' '45 Although the

Court comments that this statement of Professor Morgan
was "peculiarly pertinent" to the question then before it,
it is also to be noted that the quotation of this statement
was really not in response to any issue then before the
Court for decision. In view of the consistency with
Morgan's views which the Court maintained in reaching
its decision that substantive use of an extrajudicial identification is not hearsay, the fact that the Court went farther to indorse, maybe as dictum, the ideas which Morgan
has long espoused with respect to the general area of extrajudicial statements of a witness may be of significance in
indicating what answer the court might give in other cases
involving the admissibility of the prior statements of
witnesses.
The problem is to determine whether the Court was
simply making a philosophical comment as to the unjustifiability of classifying as hearsay the prior statements of
a witness-declarant, or was indorsing the bread proposition which Morgan has plainly stated: that the extra"Judy v. State, ibid.
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192 (1948).
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judicial statements of a declarant-witness are not hearsay. 46
Analysis of the court's opinion indicates that the Court may
well be advancing and indorsing the broad view of Professor Morgan. It was not at all necessary that the Court
hold that substantive use of an extrajudicial identification
is not hearsay. The same result could have been reached
by holding that admission of the extrajudicial identification
as substantive evidence was an exception to the hearsay
rule; this would have involved merely an extension of
the position taken in the Basoff case. 7 Presumably, confronted with the alternative definitions and views in this
area, the Court deliberately chose to adopt the Morgan
definition of hearsay, and, applying that definition, concluded that substantive use of the evidence objected to was
not hearsay. Almost as if to indicate that it did not intend
this decision to be a mere aberration in the general
area of extrajudicial statements, the Court seems, with
equal deliberation, to indicate its intention that the doctrine which it has announced with respect to extrajudicial
identifications will be applied also with respect to all
extrajudicial statements of a witness."
The effect of this is not so astounding as it might seem,
at first impression. First, the rule would apply only to
the extrajudicial statements of the witness himself, as to
which, the witness would be present and subject to any
testing required by law for determination of his competency and veracity. Secondly, even though there would
be no hearsay basis for the general exclusion of such evidence, all of the other exclusionary rules would nevertheless be operative to exclude testimony which is objectionable for other reasons; irrelevancy will be the basis
upon which much of this evidence can be excluded.4 9 In

"

SOME PROBEsMS OF PROOF (1956) 133. Quotation, supra, n. 30.
Supra, n. 43.
"'Precisely the same result would be reached under the UNIFORM RULSs
OF EVIDENCE (1953) which discard the traditional view excluding prior
statements of a witness where the witness is available for cross-examination. The UNIFORM RULES [Rule 63 (1)], however, provide for admission
of such evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather than multiplying exceptions to the hearsay rule, the approach of the Maryland Court
in Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A. 2d 29 (1958) seems much to be
preferred, especially where there is equally reasonable basis for not classifying such evidence as hearsay.
" In Maryland, there is an additional factor imposed upon the use of
prior consistent statements by 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, §3, which
provides:
"... nor shall it be competent, in any case, for any party to the cause
who has been examined therein as a witness, to corroborate his testimony when impeached by proof of his own declarations or statements
made to third persons out of the presence and hearing of the adverse
party; . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
4 7MORGAN,
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the limited area of extrajudicial identification, to which the
Court's decision is necessarily limited by the facts of the
Judy case, there is no doubt that the Court's decision is emminently sound. The indications, by way of dicta, of things
which might be forthcoming, certainly vindicate Professor
Morgan's early faith in the Maryland Court of Appeals. 0
One cannot avoid wondering, however, whether in a case
other than one involving extrajudicial identification, the
Court will hold in accord with the broad view of Morgan as
to extrajudicial statements of a witness-declarant. The
theoretical soundness of the Morgan view is difficult to deny,
but the practical problems which might arise from its
application to extrajudicial statements in general are undeniably great. On an elementary level, these difficulties
are clearly dramatized in the case of a prior inconsistent
statement. Under the Morgan view, the prior inconsistent
statements of a witness-declarant should be admissible as
substantive evidence. The present limitation of use of
such statements for impeachment purposes (and the myriad
limitations imposed even upon that usage) would be eradicated, and opposing counsel would be free to introduce
them almost without qualification. Presumably, there would
be no requirement that such prior inconsistent statements
be vouched for as to accuracy by any witness at the trial.
In view of the fact that the Maryland Court of Appeals
has often repeated its opinion that the prior inconsistent
statements of a witness are admissible only as impeaching,
and not as substantive, evidence, problems of stare decisis
also make extension of the Morgan view beyond the particular case of extrajudicial identifications (and possibly
extrajudicial consistent statements, in general) improbable
in Maryland.5 1 Still another example of the kind of extrajudicial declaration which might conceivably be admissible
under the Morgan view is the self-serving extrajudicial
statement of a witness. This poses considerably less difficulty, however, for such a statement, having no special
force, could easily be rejected by the court as cumulative.
Perhaps all such difficulties are more illusory than real,
but they arise from the law as it now exists, and any attempt to change that law will require consideration of
them.
o Op. cit., supra, n. 45, 195.
51Recent cases so holding are: West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244,
251, 100 A. 2d 7 (1953) and Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 109 Md.
354, 361-2, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956).
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V.
SHOULD THERE BE

A HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR EXTRA-

JUDICIAL IDENTIFICATION WHERE WITNESS AND

DECLARANT ARE DiFERENT?
Whether or not a witness should be permitted to testify
as to an extrajudicial identification made by another person poses considerably greater problems than where declarant and witness are identical. In the Basoff case,5 2 a
policewoman was permitted to testify that the prosecuting
witness had recognized the defendant's photograph among
photographs of twelve other men. On appeal, the Court
did not consider what difference, if any, results from the
fact that it was not the declarant who was testifying as
to the extrajudicial identification, but a third person who
had witnessed that identification. Implicit, however, in the
Court's decision is its acceptance of the idea that evidence
of an extrajudicial identification may be presented either
by the declarant himself or by some third person who witnessed the identification. To remove any doubt that may
have existed regarding this, the Court, in Bulluck v. State, 3
rejected the defendant's contention that the testimony of
a detective that he saw and heard the victim identify the
accused in a line-up was hearsay and inadmissible. Without any discussion, the Court
stated that such evidence
54
was "clearly admissible".
On its face, it would seem that testimony of this sort
would involve the most flagrant violation of the hearsay
rule, regardless of which definition of hearsay one chose
to follow. 5 A person, not the witness, has made an out-2208 Md. 643, 119 A. 2d 917 (1956).
- 219 Md. 67, 148 A. 2d 433 (1959).
Ibid., 74.
0 Williams v. State, 152 Ga. 498, 110 S.E. 286 (1922) (admitted evidence
of an extrajudicial identification made by the witness, but indicated that
it would be hearsay to attempt to establish such identification by testimony
of a third person) ; People v. Infantino, 224 App. Div. 193, 230 N.Y.S. 66,
(1928) (construing N.Y. CoDm CraM. PRoc. (1953) §393-b, which had earlier
been construed in People v. Spinello, 227 App. Div. 712, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 803
(1951), to authorize substantive use of extrajudicial Identification the
Court held that the statute permits the use of the extrajudicial statement
of a witness only, and does not authorize testimony by a third person as
to such extrajudicial identification) ; State v. Lanegan, 192 Or. 691, 236
P. 2d 438, 440 (1951) ("Evidence of extrajudicial Identification of a defendant by a person other than the witness who testifies to such identification is hearsay, and the objection to such evidence in this case should
have been sustained") ; State v. Willie, 199 La. 181, 198 So. 897, 899 (1940)
(quoting an earlier case, with approval "'The contents of a letter
written by a third person concerning accused cannot be read to the jury,
being hearsay, unless the person who wrote the letter is produced to testify
and to be cross-examined.'") ; Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149,

1959]

EXTRA JUDICIAL IDENTIFICATION

219

of-court statement, which was offered in evidence by the
witness for the truth of the assertion which it contained.
In the Basoff case, the Court clearly recognized that the
declarant and witness were different persons, but it seemed
to regard that fact as making no difference as to admissibility of the evidence. As to that case, it may be argued
that no hearsay problem arises since the extrajudicial identification was accepted only as corroborative (crediting)
evidence. But, the problem is clearly posed by the Bulluck
case, where on the authority of the Judy case,56 the identification was apparently accepted as substantive evidence.
For the same reasons for which it has been contended
that an exception to the hearsay rule should exist to admit
testimony of an extrajudicial identification, where declarant and witness are identical, one might conceivably argue
also that an exception should exist to admit such testimony
where the witness and declarant are different persons.
It would seem that the result to be achieved in either
case, supporting an identification made in court which has
little testimonial force, is the same. The element of necessity, however, upon which exceptions to the hearsay rule
are usually predicated, seems to be lacking. Where the
declarant is available as a witness, there is no necessity
for having the evidence introduced by some other person,
since the same testimony can be elicited from the declarantwitness. Where the declarant is unavailable by reason of
incapacitation, death or other acceptable reason, then, within the existing framework of the law of Evidence, adequate
necessity might be said to exist for admitting the evidence
of the extrajudicial identification through the testimony
of a third-person-witness, as an exception to the hearsay
rule.5 7 In both of these situations, however, there looms
a tremendous question as to the reliability of a third-personwitness, the possible inaccuracies of whose testimony cannot be demonstrated by cross-examination. The crossexaminer cannot show that the declarant did not observe
accurately, that his powers of perception were inadequate,
that his recollection is imperfect, or indeed that he was
125 A. 2d 442 (1956) (indicates clearly that testimony of a witness who
merely heard or saw an extrajudicial identification made by another
would be hearsay) ; State v. Evans, 98 Or. 214, 192 P. 1062 (1920) ; People
v. Lukoszus, 242 Ill. 101, 89 N.E. 749 (1909).
218 Md. 168, 146 A. 2d 29 (1958).
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 503, Admissibility of Evidence of
Hearsay Declaration:
"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds
that the declarant

"(a) is unavailable as a witnesss, or
"(b)

is present and subject to cross-examination."
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not telling the truth. Testimony from the relation of a
third person to the event, even where the declarant is
known, cannot be subjected to such tests. Obviously, such
testimony is subject to every conceivable hearsay objection.
The view which the Maryland court seems to adopt in
the Bulluck case,18 whereby a witness may testify without
restriction as to an extrajudicial identification made by himself or another is not without support. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and other state courts seem to have
adopted a similar rule.59 In view of the real dangers against
which the hearsay rule affords protection, and in view of
the fact that the hearsay statements of a declarant, offered
in evidence by a witness other than the declarant, may involve such dangers, one may seriously question the advisibility of admitting such evidence except, perhaps, where
the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the trial court,
in its discretion, determines that the situation creates such
necessity as justifies the use of such evidence.

Pre-Emption Of State Regulation And Constitutional
Exclusion - Regulation Of "Elevation"
In Interstate Commerce
Public Service Commission v. Western Maryland
Railway Company'
By ROBERT E. PowFF.
The Public Service Commission of Maryland, after conducting an oral hearing wherein it determined that it
had jurisdiction over the leasing of grain elevators under
the provisions of Article 78, Section 24(b) (1) and (3) and
58Supra, n. 53.
"CDI Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. den., 268
U.S. 706 (1925) ; United States v. Forzano, 190 F. 2d 687 (2nd Cir. 1951) ;
United States v. Fox, 97 F. 2d 913 (2nd Cir. 1938). At least two state
courts have admitted, without comment, testimony as to an extrajudicial
identification made by another: State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 144 N.W.
142 (1913) (county attorney permitted to testify as to an identification
made by a boy of eight) ; State v. Wilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P. 2d 288
(1951) (Chief of Police permitted to testify as to an identification made
by the prosecuting witness). In Johnson v. State, 254 Wis. 320, 36 N.W.
2d 86 (1949), testimony of police officers as extrajudicial identification of
defendant, held not hearsay.
1 The Daily Record, Sept. 19, 1959 (Cir. Court of Baltimore City).

